Vasiliy Shapovalov@_vshapovalov· about 1 month ago

RT @laurashin: Lido just launched dual governance. 🤝 But what does that even mean? @hasufl & @_vshapovalov from @LidoFinance delve into: ⚙️How the dual governance model works 📉 Whether this dilutes LDO token value 🏛️ What this means for DeFi—and if others will follow 🏦 Whether this might get institutions off the sidelines Timestamps: 🎬 0:00 Intro 🧩 2:07 What problem Lido’s new governance model is actually solving ⚙️ 7:33 How dual governance works—and why it’s such a big shift 🚀 15:32 Why Hasu says this changes everything for Lido 🧠 22:20 What the team had to weigh when designing the system 🛡️ 30:26 How Lido built in resistance to attacks 📉 32:02 Whether this system weakens the value of the LDO token 🗳️ 38:58 How they’re thinking about fixing DeFi’s voter apathy problem 🏦 45:29 Whether institutions will see this as a positive sign and embrace stETH 🌐 48:01 How this compares to Sky’s “emergency shutdown”—and whether DeFi will follow suit Thank you to @BitwiseInvest for sponsoring this episode!

Hasu⚡️🤖@hasufl· about 1 month ago

RT @laurashin: Lido just launched dual governance. 🤝 But what does that even mean? @hasufl & @_vshapovalov from @LidoFinance delve into: ⚙️How the dual governance model works 📉 Whether this dilutes LDO token value 🏛️ What this means for DeFi—and if others will follow 🏦 Whether this might get institutions off the sidelines Timestamps: 🎬 0:00 Intro 🧩 2:07 What problem Lido’s new governance model is actually solving ⚙️ 7:33 How dual governance works—and why it’s such a big shift 🚀 15:32 Why Hasu says this changes everything for Lido 🧠 22:20 What the team had to weigh when designing the system 🛡️ 30:26 How Lido built in resistance to attacks 📉 32:02 Whether this system weakens the value of the LDO token 🗳️ 38:58 How they’re thinking about fixing DeFi’s voter apathy problem 🏦 45:29 Whether institutions will see this as a positive sign and embrace stETH 🌐 48:01 How this compares to Sky’s “emergency shutdown”—and whether DeFi will follow suit Thank you to @BitwiseInvest for sponsoring this episode!

Lido@LidoFinance· about 1 month ago

RT @laurashin: Lido just launched dual governance. 🤝 But what does that even mean? @hasufl & @_vshapovalov from @LidoFinance delve into: ⚙️How the dual governance model works 📉 Whether this dilutes LDO token value 🏛️ What this means for DeFi—and if others will follow 🏦 Whether this might get institutions off the sidelines Timestamps: 🎬 0:00 Intro 🧩 2:07 What problem Lido’s new governance model is actually solving ⚙️ 7:33 How dual governance works—and why it’s such a big shift 🚀 15:32 Why Hasu says this changes everything for Lido 🧠 22:20 What the team had to weigh when designing the system 🛡️ 30:26 How Lido built in resistance to attacks 📉 32:02 Whether this system weakens the value of the LDO token 🗳️ 38:58 How they’re thinking about fixing DeFi’s voter apathy problem 🏦 45:29 Whether institutions will see this as a positive sign and embrace stETH 🌐 48:01 How this compares to Sky’s “emergency shutdown”—and whether DeFi will follow suit Thank you to @BitwiseInvest for sponsoring this episode!

Laura Shin@laurashin· about 1 month ago

Lido just launched dual governance. 🤝 But what does that even mean? @hasufl & @_vshapovalov from @LidoFinance delve into: ⚙️How the dual governance model works 📉 Whether this dilutes LDO token value 🏛️ What this means for DeFi—and if others will follow 🏦 Whether this might get institutions off the sidelines Timestamps: 🎬 0:00 Intro 🧩 2:07 What problem Lido’s new governance model is actually solving ⚙️ 7:33 How dual governance works—and why it’s such a big shift 🚀 15:32 Why Hasu says this changes everything for Lido 🧠 22:20 What the team had to weigh when designing the system 🛡️ 30:26 How Lido built in resistance to attacks 📉 32:02 Whether this system weakens the value of the LDO token 🗳️ 38:58 How they’re thinking about fixing DeFi’s voter apathy problem 🏦 45:29 Whether institutions will see this as a positive sign and embrace stETH 🌐 48:01 How this compares to Sky’s “emergency shutdown”—and whether DeFi will follow suit Thank you to @BitwiseInvest for sponsoring this episode!

Lido@LidoFinance· about 2 months ago

RT @hasufl: “There used to be this dilemma between trustlessness and liquidity, and dual governance is effectively breaking that dilemma,” [Hasu] said. “You no longer have to choose — you can have both.” Great explainer for Dual Governance, coming to Lido next week, courtesy of @Blockworks_

Vasiliy Shapovalov@_vshapovalov· about 2 months ago

RT @hasufl: “There used to be this dilemma between trustlessness and liquidity, and dual governance is effectively breaking that dilemma,” [Hasu] said. “You no longer have to choose — you can have both.” Great explainer for Dual Governance, coming to Lido next week, courtesy of @Blockworks_

Hasu⚡️🤖@hasufl· about 2 months ago

“There used to be this dilemma between trustlessness and liquidity, and dual governance is effectively breaking that dilemma,” [Hasu] said. “You no longer have to choose — you can have both.” Great explainer for Dual Governance, coming to Lido next week, courtesy of @Blockworks_

Hasu⚡️🤖@hasufl· 4 months ago

RT @crainbf: Talking with Ethereum / @LidoFinance 's philosopher-in-residence @hasufl. Was super fun to talk about Hasu's journey into crypto, work on Lido and the state of Ethereum.

Brian F***** Crain@crainbf· 4 months ago

Talking with Ethereum / @LidoFinance 's philosopher-in-residence @hasufl. Was super fun to talk about Hasu's journey into crypto, work on Lido and the state of Ethereum.

Strata@Strata_BTC· 5 months ago

Crypto's renaissance man is coming back to Bitcoin with @hasufl. New episode of Stratacast, hosted by @david_seroy from @AlpenLabs. SPOTIFY: https://t.co/UyK9raUDy6 APPLE: ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://t.co/ETY3YqWhmN YOUTUBE: ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://t.co/dqo0lewra9⁠⁠⁠⁠ https://t.co/UVkbk9lf01 Chapters 00:00 Hasu's Journey Into Crypto 10:03 The Evolution of Poker and Its Parallels with Crypto 19:46 The Feedback Loop of Learning in Crypto 30:12 Bitcoin's Security Budget: A Critical Discussion 37:31 Recapping Bitcoin's Security Budget Crisis 44:07 Exploring MEV and Its Implications 57:57 Envisioning Bitcoin's Future: Programmability and Privacy 01:12:44 Exploring Bitcoin's Privacy Features 01:15:04 The Risks of Reinventing the Wheel in Bitcoin Development 01:17:23 Concerns Over Bitcoin's Brain Drain and Builder Ecosystem 01:19:11 The Shift in Perception Towards Bitcoin 01:21:22 The Integration of Bitcoin with Other Crypto Ecosystems 01:22:49 The Future of Network Effects in Crypto 01:27:20 Understanding Staking in Bitcoin vs. Ethereum 01:32:44 The Role of Trust in Layer 2 Solutions 01:37:08 Innovations in Rollup Technology and MEV

Hasu⚡️🤖@hasufl· 5 months ago

RT @galaxyhq: Ethereum’s Culture Problem with @hasufl On #InfiniteJungle EP 84, @christine_dkim welcomes @hasufl, Strategic Advisor to @LidoFinance and Strategy Lead at Flashbots, to discuss Lido V3, $ETH's underperformance, and what needs to change in Ethereum's research and development culture. Timestamps: (00:00) - Intro (01:29) - What is Lido v3? (04:52) - What risks does the V3 upgrade entail? (12:35) - Why should institutions stake with Lido? (20:42) - Is the Lido DAO competitive against CEXs? (31:50) - How V3 enables restaking on Lido (34:34) - Hasu's thoughts on ETH's underperformance (40:33) - Are L2s parasitic to ETH value? (43:10) - Ethereum's culture problem

Hasu⚡️🤖@hasufl· 5 months ago

RT @christine_dkim: 3. Plan upgrades by big goals not by EIPs. I recommend listening to Hasu's full pitch on the problem of Ethereum's culture and solutions to it by checking out the full episode below: - https://t.co/k8OiZzTFqX - https://t.co/Dpwldnzz93 - https://t.co/2LIe7bjR7E

Hasu⚡️🤖@hasufl· 5 months ago

RT @christine_dkim: One of the main problems of Ethereum, outside of poor L2 UX, is Ethereum's culture. To address this, Hasu argues for three key changes. 1. Allocate mindshare away from “endgame" planning. https://t.co/vS81JfUa9G

Galaxy@galaxyhq· 5 months ago

Ethereum’s Culture Problem with @hasufl On #InfiniteJungle EP 84, @christine_dkim welcomes @hasufl, Strategic Advisor to @LidoFinance and Strategy Lead at Flashbots, to discuss Lido V3, $ETH's underperformance, and what needs to change in Ethereum's research and development culture. Timestamps: (00:00) - Intro (01:29) - What is Lido v3? (04:52) - What risks does the V3 upgrade entail? (12:35) - Why should institutions stake with Lido? (20:42) - Is the Lido DAO competitive against CEXs? (31:50) - How V3 enables restaking on Lido (34:34) - Hasu's thoughts on ETH's underperformance (40:33) - Are L2s parasitic to ETH value? (43:10) - Ethereum's culture problem

Christine Kim@christine_dkim· 5 months ago

3. Plan upgrades by big goals not by EIPs. I recommend listening to Hasu's full pitch on the problem of Ethereum's culture and solutions to it by checking out the full episode below: - https://t.co/k8OiZzTFqX - https://t.co/Dpwldnzz93 - https://t.co/2LIe7bjR7E

Christine Kim@christine_dkim· 5 months ago

One of the main problems of Ethereum, outside of poor L2 UX, is Ethereum's culture. To address this, Hasu argues for three key changes. 1. Allocate mindshare away from “endgame" planning. https://t.co/vS81JfUa9G

Christine Kim@christine_dkim· 5 months ago

Today on the Infinite Jungle podcast, I interview @LidoFinance's @hasufl about the Lido V3 upgrade and Ethereum's culture problem. It has been a running theme on Season 2 of the show to ask my guests about what Ethereum needs to succeed. Here's what Hasu said:

Bybit@Bybit_Official· 6 months ago

🚀 Get ready to dive deep into the world of P2P trading on Bybit! ⭐ Join our AMA P2P: VN Event - https://t.co/Vhl63VYDX3 📅 Feb 20, 2025, 8:00PM UTC+7 🎤 Host: Hasu 🎙 Guest: Dinhtuan OTC 🔗 https://t.co/S62HxMizNi #Bybit #TheCryptoArk #BybitAMA https://t.co/d1BBlJPqYf

Token Terminal | We are hiring!@tokenterminal· 6 months ago

RT @chainlank: hasu dropped some alpha on maker/sky recently, will do a good deed and pass it along - "tether is one of the most successful business ever, if i could buy 1% of tether, there would be nothing better than that.. Think of maker/sky as tether 2.0, but you could own a piece of it"

Fat Tony ☯️@chainlank· 6 months ago

hasu dropped some alpha on maker/sky recently, will do a good deed and pass it along - "tether is one of the most successful business ever, if i could buy 1% of tether, there would be nothing better than that.. Think of maker/sky as tether 2.0, but you could own a piece of it"

Hasu⚡️🤖@hasufl· 7 months ago

RT @hayeah: i learned a lot from hasu's podcast, and expect to learn a lot from his newsletter

hh@hayeah· 7 months ago

i learned a lot from hasu's podcast, and expect to learn a lot from his newsletter

Hasu⚡️🤖@hasufl· 7 months ago

RT @kramnotmark: cat + hasu essays in less than a week? christmas in january.

kram@kramnotmark· 7 months ago

cat + hasu essays in less than a week? christmas in january.

Oisín Kyne | Obol@OisinKyne· 7 months ago

Just caught up on this great overview of eth staking as it stands today. I appreciate the commentary from Hasu and Mike on Distributed Validators, particularly how they will become ‘table stakes’ for staking, to reduce slashing risk and improve operating performance.

Hasu⚡️🤖@hasufl· 8 months ago

RT @therollupco: EXCLUSIVE: Rollup-Boost, Unichain, And TEEs With Hasu & Robert Miller For today's episode, @ayyyeandy & @robbie_rollup had @hasufl and @bertcmiller on for an insightful discussion about: > Why Hasu thinks 2025 is the year of TEEs > What Rollup-Boost enables > The MEV Supply Chain Debate > BuilderNet for Ethereum > Unichain & Purpose-Built Chains Outlook Full episode links below. Timestamps: 01:22 Unichain Explained 08:44 LVR and LP Experiences 21:04 Rollup-Boost Explained 35:15 TEE Security and Tradeoffs 49:04 Open Hardware Breakdown 56:09 Block Production & Validation 01:03:19 Ethereum MEV Supply Chain

Hasu⚡️🤖@hasufl· 8 months ago

RT @ayyyeandy: Such good time with Hasu and Robert on this episode. Been an uncommon core fan since the early days and we had a really well structured, technical convo here. Happy holidays fam!! 🎁🎄

Andy@ayyyeandy· 8 months ago

Such good time with Hasu and Robert on this episode. Been an uncommon core fan since the early days and we had a really well structured, technical convo here. Happy holidays fam!! 🎁🎄

The Rollup@therollupco· 8 months ago

EXCLUSIVE: Rollup-Boost, Unichain, And TEEs With Hasu & Robert Miller For today's episode, @ayyyeandy & @robbie_rollup had @hasufl and @bertcmiller on for an insightful discussion about: > Why Hasu thinks 2025 is the year of TEEs > What Rollup-Boost enables > The MEV Supply Chain Debate > BuilderNet for Ethereum > Unichain & Purpose-Built Chains Outlook Full episode links below. Timestamps: 01:22 Unichain Explained 08:44 LVR and LP Experiences 21:04 Rollup-Boost Explained 35:15 TEE Security and Tradeoffs 49:04 Open Hardware Breakdown 56:09 Block Production & Validation 01:03:19 Ethereum MEV Supply Chain

Mippo 🟪@MikeIppolito_· 8 months ago

Gud pod, nice to have Hasu and Jon back https://t.co/BwZzGsnDZu

Hasu⚡️🤖@hasufl· 8 months ago

RT @simanta_gautam: thanks hasu 🙏 this work builds on a collective effort of many ideas by many different bitcoiners over the years (e.g. @JeremyRubin’s work on bit commitments via lamport sigs, @robin_linus’s ideas on bitvm & bitvm2, and more). human ingenuity + permissionless, programmable money 🚀

Simanta Gautam@simanta_gautam· 8 months ago

thanks hasu 🙏 this work builds on a collective effort of many ideas by many different bitcoiners over the years (e.g. @JeremyRubin’s work on bit commitments via lamport sigs, @robin_linus’s ideas on bitvm & bitvm2, and more). human ingenuity + permissionless, programmable money 🚀

BSCN@BSCNews· 12 months ago

RT @BSCNews: CRYPTO RESEARCH FIRM CHAINBOUND RAISES $4.6M FOR SUB-SECOND ETHEREUM CONFIRMATIONS - @chainbound_, a crypto research and development firm, raised $4.6 million in seed financing to advance its innovative Bolt Protocol, according to a recent The Block report. Key Points: - The seed round was led by @cyberFund_ with participation from @Maven11Capital, @robotventures, and @BanklessVC . Notable angel investors include Hasu from Flashbots, Kubi Mensah from Titan Builder, and Ethereum Foundation researcher Mike Neuder. - Bolt, Chainbound's flagship product, is designed to allow preconfirmations, which let users receive transaction confirmations even before they are added to an Ethereum block. - This can reportedly enhance the user experience by making transactions like transfers, mints, and approvals faster and more efficient. - Bolt aims to revolutionize transaction processing on Ethereum by enabling sub-second preconfirmations, slashing the current average confirmation time from seven seconds. -The protocol is set to debut on the Helder testnet, with plans to go live on the Ethereum mainnet by the end of the year.

BSCN@BSCNews· 12 months ago

CRYPTO RESEARCH FIRM CHAINBOUND RAISES $4.6M FOR SUB-SECOND ETHEREUM CONFIRMATIONS - @chainbound_, a crypto research and development firm, raised $4.6 million in seed financing to advance its innovative Bolt Protocol, according to a recent The Block report. Key Points: - The seed round was led by @cyberFund_ with participation from @Maven11Capital, @robotventures, and @BanklessVC . Notable angel investors include Hasu from Flashbots, Kubi Mensah from Titan Builder, and Ethereum Foundation researcher Mike Neuder. - Bolt, Chainbound's flagship product, is designed to allow preconfirmations, which let users receive transaction confirmations even before they are added to an Ethereum block. - This can reportedly enhance the user experience by making transactions like transfers, mints, and approvals faster and more efficient. - Bolt aims to revolutionize transaction processing on Ethereum by enabling sub-second preconfirmations, slashing the current average confirmation time from seven seconds. -The protocol is set to debut on the Helder testnet, with plans to go live on the Ethereum mainnet by the end of the year.

Zhixiong Pan@nake13· about 1 year ago

RT @0xNatalie860: 近日，Flashbots 战略主管 @hasufl 指出：在 Solana 链上，大部分交易量实际上是通过自动做市商（AMM）完成的，而不是通过中央限价订单簿（CLOB，或简称为订单簿模式）。这一结论令人意外，因为不少人曾认为 Solana 赢得市场的的重要原因之一其能够支持 CLOB。 如 @fishkiller 所说：「当初 Solana 的一个核心卖点，就是终于可以在上面搞订单簿 dex 了，以及，『订单簿交易才是 dex 的未来』。」 AMM 主导市场的原因仅在于长尾资产？ Hasu 的这一发现在社区内迅速引发了广泛讨论。对此，Multicoin Capital 合伙人 @KyleSamani 解释道，在长尾资产的市场中，缺少真正的做市商（MM）来提供流动性，而 AMM 的出现弥补了这一不足，从而形成了当前 AMM 主导的局面。Solana 的成功不仅仅依赖于 CLOB，而是因为它能够提供始终如一的快速和低成本的交易体验，能够为各种类型的资产提供支持。此外，Solana 的无桥接机制（no bridging）也是其成功的一个重要因素，因为用户普遍对跨链桥接持负面态度。 Taproot Wizards 创始人 @udiWertheimer 也认为 AMM 在支持长尾资产方面具有独特优势，能够帮助小型社区为长尾资产快速启动流动性。Solana 上有大量的 memecoin，对于这些资产来说，AMM 是非常合适的选择。 @0xkrane 则进一步将市场划分为三种类型：memecoin、主要资产（如 SOL/USDC）和稳定币。他指出，AMM 在 memecoin 市场中表现突出，因为这些资产需要良好的被动流动性，而 CLOB 在这方面表现较差。对于主要资产，虽然 CLOB 在一些情况下占据了一定地位，但 AMM 仍然具有竞争力。在稳定币市场中，CLOB 的应用尚未广泛普及。 然而，Ambient 创始人 @0xdoug 提出了不同的看法，并通过数据进行了反驳。他指出，许多人误认为 Solana 上的 AMM 交易量主要来自一些不活跃的长尾资产。然而，他提供的数据表明，即使在主要交易对（如 SOL/USDC）中，AMM 的交易量也远远超过了 CLOB。例如，Orca 在 24 小时内的交易量高达 2.5 亿美元，而 Phoenix 的交易量仅为 1400 万美元。即使采用最有利于 CLOB 的假设（使用 Phoenix 的 7 天平均每日交易量而不是当天的较低交易量，并尽可能多地计入 CLOB 的交易量），AMM 在主要交易对上的交易量也比 CLOB 高出 50%，如果不采用这些假设，差距甚至会扩大到 10 倍。 社区观点：CLOB 的发展受到区块链性能的限制 AMM 在 Solana 上占主导地位的原因不仅仅在于长尾资产，更深层次的原因在于区块链性能的限制。许多社区成员认为，CLOB 的发展受限于区块链的性能瓶颈。... 更多内容见全文：https://t.co/hpeEPlp0pd

0xNatalie💮@0xNatalie860· about 1 year ago

近日，Flashbots 战略主管 @hasufl 指出：在 Solana 链上，大部分交易量实际上是通过自动做市商（AMM）完成的，而不是通过中央限价订单簿（CLOB，或简称为订单簿模式）。这一结论令人意外，因为不少人曾认为 Solana 赢得市场的的重要原因之一其能够支持 CLOB。 如 @fishkiller 所说：「当初 Solana 的一个核心卖点，就是终于可以在上面搞订单簿 dex 了，以及，『订单簿交易才是 dex 的未来』。」 AMM 主导市场的原因仅在于长尾资产？ Hasu 的这一发现在社区内迅速引发了广泛讨论。对此，Multicoin Capital 合伙人 @KyleSamani 解释道，在长尾资产的市场中，缺少真正的做市商（MM）来提供流动性，而 AMM 的出现弥补了这一不足，从而形成了当前 AMM 主导的局面。Solana 的成功不仅仅依赖于 CLOB，而是因为它能够提供始终如一的快速和低成本的交易体验，能够为各种类型的资产提供支持。此外，Solana 的无桥接机制（no bridging）也是其成功的一个重要因素，因为用户普遍对跨链桥接持负面态度。 Taproot Wizards 创始人 @udiWertheimer 也认为 AMM 在支持长尾资产方面具有独特优势，能够帮助小型社区为长尾资产快速启动流动性。Solana 上有大量的 memecoin，对于这些资产来说，AMM 是非常合适的选择。 @0xkrane 则进一步将市场划分为三种类型：memecoin、主要资产（如 SOL/USDC）和稳定币。他指出，AMM 在 memecoin 市场中表现突出，因为这些资产需要良好的被动流动性，而 CLOB 在这方面表现较差。对于主要资产，虽然 CLOB 在一些情况下占据了一定地位，但 AMM 仍然具有竞争力。在稳定币市场中，CLOB 的应用尚未广泛普及。 然而，Ambient 创始人 @0xdoug 提出了不同的看法，并通过数据进行了反驳。他指出，许多人误认为 Solana 上的 AMM 交易量主要来自一些不活跃的长尾资产。然而，他提供的数据表明，即使在主要交易对（如 SOL/USDC）中，AMM 的交易量也远远超过了 CLOB。例如，Orca 在 24 小时内的交易量高达 2.5 亿美元，而 Phoenix 的交易量仅为 1400 万美元。即使采用最有利于 CLOB 的假设（使用 Phoenix 的 7 天平均每日交易量而不是当天的较低交易量，并尽可能多地计入 CLOB 的交易量），AMM 在主要交易对上的交易量也比 CLOB 高出 50%，如果不采用这些假设，差距甚至会扩大到 10 倍。 社区观点：CLOB 的发展受到区块链性能的限制 AMM 在 Solana 上占主导地位的原因不仅仅在于长尾资产，更深层次的原因在于区块链性能的限制。许多社区成员认为，CLOB 的发展受限于区块链的性能瓶颈。... 更多内容见全文：https://t.co/hpeEPlp0pd

Feng Liu@fishkiller· about 1 year ago

Hasu 问了一个好问题，但是到现在为止，都没看到好答案呢。。。 （可不是啊，当初 Solana 的一个核心卖点，就是终于可以在上面搞订单簿 dex 了，以及，「订单簿交易才是 dex 的未来！！！」）

Token Terminal@tokenterminal· about 1 year ago

RT @danrobinson: I have a ton of respect for Hasu, but this is an example of possibly my least favorite argument I’ve never seriously worried that Ethereum will outexecute a great project, including Lido or Flashbots The worry is always that the platform will go too slow, or do the wrong thing

Dan Robinson@danrobinson· about 1 year ago

I have a ton of respect for Hasu, but this is an example of possibly my least favorite argument I’ve never seriously worried that Ethereum will outexecute a great project, including Lido or Flashbots The worry is always that the platform will go too slow, or do the wrong thing

UMA 🥚@UMAprotocol· about 1 year ago

RT @FourPillarsFP: : : [Opinion] OEV and Strategy of Building DeFi Protocols is Changing Opinion by @xparadigms The first OEV (Oracle Extractable Value) has been captured in Ethereum by Oval. This means the profits previously captured by searchers from oracle price updates can now be captured by DeFi dapps. This could open up a new revenue source for dapps that was previously captured at the infrastructure level. The way dapps capture value is changing. They are building their own rollup or appchain, launching their tokens, and implementing additional measures to capture revenue for token holders. Although not many protocols have built effective profit-sharing models for token holders and for themselves, initiatives like OEV are a great approach to creating sustainable business models. 1. Background - What is OEV and What are the Related Projects 1.1 What is OEV? OEV is a specific type of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) that arises from the updates provided by oracles, which are essential for supplying external data such as asset prices to blockchain-based smart contracts. OEV is generated when there is a time lag between the oracle's price update and the market's response, creating opportunities for searchers to exploit this information asymmetry for profit. This value leakage can be significant, especially in DeFi protocols where timely and accurate price feeds are crucial for functions like liquidations and arbitrage. Source: Announcing Oval: Earn Protocol Revenue by Capturing Oracle MEV The diagram illustrates the process of OEV extraction and distribution in the Ethereum. This process ensures that MEV opportunities from oracle feed are efficiently captured and distributed. Here is a step-by-step breakdown: a. Chainlink Oracle submits a price update to the Ethereum Mempool, e.g., ETH/USD = $2,500. b. Ethereum Mempool receives the price update and holds it temporarily. c. MEV-Searchers explore the mempool for liquidation opportunities. They bid for the right to use the $2,500 price update. The highest bidder wins and backruns the transaction. d. UMA Oval shields the $2,500 price update. Executes an auction within MEV-Share. e. With MEV-Share, the auction proceeds are received by Protocol A. The $2,500 price update is added to the block, and the searcher's backrun transaction follows immediately. f. The transaction is added to Etherereum blockchain, and the revenue is shared. 1.2 Projects Building OEV Infra Several projects are actively working on capturing OEV: a. Oval, developed by UMA in collaboration with Flashbots, aims to capture OEV by auctioning the right to access oracle data updates, thereby allowing protocols to retain and profit from this value rather than losing it to external actors. b. API3 is building an OEV network as a Layer2, built with Polygon zkEVM that focuses on creating a market for oracle updates, enabling more timely and accurate data provision and providing additonal revenue to protocols. c. Pyth Network is another project that has the potential to provide OEV for projects. it has a pull-based oracle mechanism that can create a unique opportunity for OEV by giving applications more control over how and when they incorporate price updates. Unlike push-based systems where the transaction space following an oracle update is highly contested, Pyth's pull model allows applications to request price updates on-demand. This design could enable protocols to implement custom MEV extraction or redistribution systems. 2. Takeaway Dapps are looking for new ways to generate additional revenue, rather than letting it be captured at the infrastructure level. Some experimental approaches include launching their own Layer2, appchains, and front-end fees. The primitives of DeFi are now sufficient, and current efforts focus on capturing missed revenue opportunities and making protocols more sustainable. The strategy for building DeFi is changing. Especially on OEV, this development could lead to a more sustainable and efficient DeFi ecosystem, where value is not lost to third-party searchers but is instead used to benefit the protocol and its participants. As the technology and mechanisms for capturing OEV mature, it is anticipated that more DeFi projects will adopt these solutions. Source: Unlocking DeFi Revenue by Maximizing OEV for Protocols 3. Others’ Opinion 3.1 Hasu from Flashbots - “Oval is Providing Additonal Revenue to DeFi and Users” Source: Phil Daian (Cornell) "MEV Wat Do" “At Flashbots, we’ve long held the view that dapps can drastically limit the amount of MEV they expose,” says Hasu, Strategy Lead for Flashbots. “The key insight is that, instead of blindly broadcasting a transaction to the public mempool, protocols should auction off the right to execute this transaction to a competitive market of searchers. Oval is building on that insight to finally return Oracle-Extractable Value (OEV) back to Defi protocols and their users. We look forward to supporting them on that journey.” 3.2 Eren from Four Pillars If the market recognizes the stable profitability from OEV, there is a possibility that OEV-based yield-bearing tokens could be incorporated as collateral for synthetic assets, similar to how veCRV or LRT-backed synthetic assets in the past. This idea might still be more of a speculation at this point, but it opens up intriguing possibilities for DeFi token. The potential for OEV to serve as a reliable collateral could significantly enhance the robustness and appeal of synthetic assets, providing a new layer of profitability for investors. 4. Resource: Related Articles/News/Tweets... • UMA - Announcing Oval: Earn Protocol Revenue by Capturing Oracle MEV • Multicoin Capital - Oracles and the New Frontier for Application-Owned Orderflow Auctions • Decentrlized co - Unlocking DeFi Revenue by Maximizing OEV for Protocols • Flashbots - Introduction to MEV Share • IOSG - What is OEV and Why You Should Care: Uma Oval Related People/Projects: @UMAprotocol @API3DAO @PythNetwork @chainlink @hal2001 @Decentralisedco @tumilett @desh_saurabh @hasufl @G_Gyeomm

Four Pillars@FourPillarsFP· about 1 year ago

: : [Opinion] OEV and Strategy of Building DeFi Protocols is Changing Opinion by @xparadigms The first OEV (Oracle Extractable Value) has been captured in Ethereum by Oval. This means the profits previously captured by searchers from oracle price updates can now be captured by DeFi dapps. This could open up a new revenue source for dapps that was previously captured at the infrastructure level. The way dapps capture value is changing. They are building their own rollup or appchain, launching their tokens, and implementing additional measures to capture revenue for token holders. Although not many protocols have built effective profit-sharing models for token holders and for themselves, initiatives like OEV are a great approach to creating sustainable business models. 1. Background - What is OEV and What are the Related Projects 1.1 What is OEV? OEV is a specific type of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) that arises from the updates provided by oracles, which are essential for supplying external data such as asset prices to blockchain-based smart contracts. OEV is generated when there is a time lag between the oracle's price update and the market's response, creating opportunities for searchers to exploit this information asymmetry for profit. This value leakage can be significant, especially in DeFi protocols where timely and accurate price feeds are crucial for functions like liquidations and arbitrage. Source: Announcing Oval: Earn Protocol Revenue by Capturing Oracle MEV The diagram illustrates the process of OEV extraction and distribution in the Ethereum. This process ensures that MEV opportunities from oracle feed are efficiently captured and distributed. Here is a step-by-step breakdown: a. Chainlink Oracle submits a price update to the Ethereum Mempool, e.g., ETH/USD = $2,500. b. Ethereum Mempool receives the price update and holds it temporarily. c. MEV-Searchers explore the mempool for liquidation opportunities. They bid for the right to use the $2,500 price update. The highest bidder wins and backruns the transaction. d. UMA Oval shields the $2,500 price update. Executes an auction within MEV-Share. e. With MEV-Share, the auction proceeds are received by Protocol A. The $2,500 price update is added to the block, and the searcher's backrun transaction follows immediately. f. The transaction is added to Etherereum blockchain, and the revenue is shared. 1.2 Projects Building OEV Infra Several projects are actively working on capturing OEV: a. Oval, developed by UMA in collaboration with Flashbots, aims to capture OEV by auctioning the right to access oracle data updates, thereby allowing protocols to retain and profit from this value rather than losing it to external actors. b. API3 is building an OEV network as a Layer2, built with Polygon zkEVM that focuses on creating a market for oracle updates, enabling more timely and accurate data provision and providing additonal revenue to protocols. c. Pyth Network is another project that has the potential to provide OEV for projects. it has a pull-based oracle mechanism that can create a unique opportunity for OEV by giving applications more control over how and when they incorporate price updates. Unlike push-based systems where the transaction space following an oracle update is highly contested, Pyth's pull model allows applications to request price updates on-demand. This design could enable protocols to implement custom MEV extraction or redistribution systems. 2. Takeaway Dapps are looking for new ways to generate additional revenue, rather than letting it be captured at the infrastructure level. Some experimental approaches include launching their own Layer2, appchains, and front-end fees. The primitives of DeFi are now sufficient, and current efforts focus on capturing missed revenue opportunities and making protocols more sustainable. The strategy for building DeFi is changing. Especially on OEV, this development could lead to a more sustainable and efficient DeFi ecosystem, where value is not lost to third-party searchers but is instead used to benefit the protocol and its participants. As the technology and mechanisms for capturing OEV mature, it is anticipated that more DeFi projects will adopt these solutions. Source: Unlocking DeFi Revenue by Maximizing OEV for Protocols 3. Others’ Opinion 3.1 Hasu from Flashbots - “Oval is Providing Additonal Revenue to DeFi and Users” Source: Phil Daian (Cornell) "MEV Wat Do" “At Flashbots, we’ve long held the view that dapps can drastically limit the amount of MEV they expose,” says Hasu, Strategy Lead for Flashbots. “The key insight is that, instead of blindly broadcasting a transaction to the public mempool, protocols should auction off the right to execute this transaction to a competitive market of searchers. Oval is building on that insight to finally return Oracle-Extractable Value (OEV) back to Defi protocols and their users. We look forward to supporting them on that journey.” 3.2 Eren from Four Pillars If the market recognizes the stable profitability from OEV, there is a possibility that OEV-based yield-bearing tokens could be incorporated as collateral for synthetic assets, similar to how veCRV or LRT-backed synthetic assets in the past. This idea might still be more of a speculation at this point, but it opens up intriguing possibilities for DeFi token. The potential for OEV to serve as a reliable collateral could significantly enhance the robustness and appeal of synthetic assets, providing a new layer of profitability for investors. 4. Resource: Related Articles/News/Tweets... • UMA - Announcing Oval: Earn Protocol Revenue by Capturing Oracle MEV • Multicoin Capital - Oracles and the New Frontier for Application-Owned Orderflow Auctions • Decentrlized co - Unlocking DeFi Revenue by Maximizing OEV for Protocols • Flashbots - Introduction to MEV Share • IOSG - What is OEV and Why You Should Care: Uma Oval Related People/Projects: @UMAprotocol @API3DAO @PythNetwork @chainlink @hal2001 @Decentralisedco @tumilett @desh_saurabh @hasufl @G_Gyeomm

DCF GOD@dcfgod· about 1 year ago

DCF Cap seeded w vitalik, cobie, hasu, etc. Can’t wait to megabridge to megaeth Still very early so take a gander if you’re a builder looking for a place to build 🤝🤝🤝

Evan Van Ness 🧉@evan_van_ness· over 1 year ago

RT @hanni_abu: Hasu is recommending Lido impose their influence over Ethereum's roadmap and make changes that benefit their protocol. This is what a governance attack looks like.

hanniabu.eth (Ξ, α)@hanni_abu· over 1 year ago

Hasu is recommending Lido impose their influence over Ethereum's roadmap and make changes that benefit their protocol. This is what a governance attack looks like.

sassal.eth/acc 🦇🔊@sassal0x· over 1 year ago

RT @adietrichs: I think Hasu here identifies main reason for the backlash against the recent issuance change proposal by @casparschwa and me.To be clear: Hasu is 100% right. Of course any change to such a sensitive part of the protocol requires broad community buy-in. Our intention was purely to propose this change for consideration to the community.We tried to be clear about that from the beginning, but could certainly have done a better job. As it stands, this proposal has nowhere near the required support to be accepted (quite the opposite).For context on the timeline: A final decision on inclusion on Electra will have to be made in ~4 months, barring major delays of the fork. So when we published, that was 6 months. We were aware this was a long shot and might be too short for proper community discussion and agreement, so from the beginning we thought that chances for inclusion were unclear.So why then even propose it? We separately published a big research article on the long term staking situation for Ethereum. This was the result of ~6 months of research, and more generally a conversation that has been ongoing for 2+ years.Basically, the "proper" research process here would be to only publish this endgame post, spend the next year or so debating this topic and figuring out the best roadmap (that again of course would need broad community buy-in), and only then propose concrete steps along that path.The problem: Our view is that an end state of most of ETH staked (think 80-100%) is very bad for the protocol, for multiple reasons (I'll summarize our post on that in a separate tweet soon). We think the endgame should instead be a targeting mechanism keeping staking participation at a lower level, say 20-30%.Realistically, we won't be moving towards such a system any time soon though. And we are worried that in the meantime, staking participation will keep increasing, very plausibly into the 60-90% range. If we then decide to go with such a targeting mechanism, the transition back down from this high level would be much much more painful than it would be coming from a situation closer to today.Separately, our colleague @weboftrees had been looking into alternative issuance curves for a while already. We saw one of his proposals, thought that it might be a really useful compromise for a short-term change to slow down the continued staking inflow, and decided it was worth at least proposing for Electra.Maybe even proposing anything for Electra was a mistake. I think the bigger problem was that we weren't aware this might create the impression of a "last-minute stealth core dev push". We should have been much more explicit in stressing thati) the Electra decision was still 6 months out, andii) the default for inclusion would of course be NO, and that this was just us trying to make a case for why the community should spend these 6 months debating whether the case for urgent change was strong enough to warrant accepting such a short-term change.Sorry, long tweet, but hopefully this provides some context.Side note: Even though I think this particular case was caused by a misunderstanding of our intentions, in a way I really appreciate the backlash we have been getting - it's a great illustration of the robustness of Ethereum's decentralization!

timbeiko.eth ☀️@TimBeiko· over 1 year ago

RT @adietrichs: I think Hasu here identifies main reason for the backlash against the recent issuance change proposal by @casparschwa and me.To be clear: Hasu is 100% right. Of course any change to such a sensitive part of the protocol requires broad community buy-in. Our intention was purely to propose this change for consideration to the community.We tried to be clear about that from the beginning, but could certainly have done a better job. As it stands, this proposal has nowhere near the required support to be accepted (quite the opposite).For context on the timeline: A final decision on inclusion on Electra will have to be made in ~4 months, barring major delays of the fork. So when we published, that was 6 months. We were aware this was a long shot and might be too short for proper community discussion and agreement, so from the beginning we thought that chances for inclusion were unclear.So why then even propose it? We separately published a big research article on the long term staking situation for Ethereum. This was the result of ~6 months of research, and more generally a conversation that has been ongoing for 2+ years.Basically, the "proper" research process here would be to only publish this endgame post, spend the next year or so debating this topic and figuring out the best roadmap (that again of course would need broad community buy-in), and only then propose concrete steps along that path.The problem: Our view is that an end state of most of ETH staked (think 80-100%) is very bad for the protocol, for multiple reasons (I'll summarize our post on that in a separate tweet soon). We think the endgame should instead be a targeting mechanism keeping staking participation at a lower level, say 20-30%.Realistically, we won't be moving towards such a system any time soon though. And we are worried that in the meantime, staking participation will keep increasing, very plausibly into the 60-90% range. If we then decide to go with such a targeting mechanism, the transition back down from this high level would be much much more painful than it would be coming from a situation closer to today.Separately, our colleague @weboftrees had been looking into alternative issuance curves for a while already. We saw one of his proposals, thought that it might be a really useful compromise for a short-term change to slow down the continued staking inflow, and decided it was worth at least proposing for Electra.Maybe even proposing anything for Electra was a mistake. I think the bigger problem was that we weren't aware this might create the impression of a "last-minute stealth core dev push". We should have been much more explicit in stressing thati) the Electra decision was still 6 months out, andii) the default for inclusion would of course be NO, and that this was just us trying to make a case for why the community should spend these 6 months debating whether the case for urgent change was strong enough to warrant accepting such a short-term change.Sorry, long tweet, but hopefully this provides some context.Side note: Even though I think this particular case was caused by a misunderstanding of our intentions, in a way I really appreciate the backlash we have been getting - it's a great illustration of the robustness of Ethereum's decentralization!

Hasu⚡️🤖@hasufl· over 1 year ago

RT @adietrichs: I think Hasu here identifies main reason for the backlash against the recent issuance change proposal by @casparschwa and me.To be clear: Hasu is 100% right. Of course any change to such a sensitive part of the protocol requires broad community buy-in. Our intention was purely to propose this change for consideration to the community.We tried to be clear about that from the beginning, but could certainly have done a better job. As it stands, this proposal has nowhere near the required support to be accepted (quite the opposite).For context on the timeline: A final decision on inclusion on Electra will have to be made in ~4 months, barring major delays of the fork. So when we published, that was 6 months. We were aware this was a long shot and might be too short for proper community discussion and agreement, so from the beginning we thought that chances for inclusion were unclear.So why then even propose it? We separately published a big research article on the long term staking situation for Ethereum. This was the result of ~6 months of research, and more generally a conversation that has been ongoing for 2+ years.Basically, the "proper" research process here would be to only publish this endgame post, spend the next year or so debating this topic and figuring out the best roadmap (that again of course would need broad community buy-in), and only then propose concrete steps along that path.The problem: Our view is that an end state of most of ETH staked (think 80-100%) is very bad for the protocol, for multiple reasons (I'll summarize our post on that in a separate tweet soon). We think the endgame should instead be a targeting mechanism keeping staking participation at a lower level, say 20-30%.Realistically, we won't be moving towards such a system any time soon though. And we are worried that in the meantime, staking participation will keep increasing, very plausibly into the 60-90% range. If we then decide to go with such a targeting mechanism, the transition back down from this high level would be much much more painful than it would be coming from a situation closer to today.Separately, our colleague @weboftrees had been looking into alternative issuance curves for a while already. We saw one of his proposals, thought that it might be a really useful compromise for a short-term change to slow down the continued staking inflow, and decided it was worth at least proposing for Electra.Maybe even proposing anything for Electra was a mistake. I think the bigger problem was that we weren't aware this might create the impression of a "last-minute stealth core dev push". We should have been much more explicit in stressing thati) the Electra decision was still 6 months out, andii) the default for inclusion would of course be NO, and that this was just us trying to make a case for why the community should spend these 6 months debating whether the case for urgent change was strong enough to warrant accepting such a short-term change.Sorry, long tweet, but hopefully this provides some context.Side note: Even though I think this particular case was caused by a misunderstanding of our intentions, in a way I really appreciate the backlash we have been getting - it's a great illustration of the robustness of Ethereum's decentralization!

ansgar.eth 🦇🔊 .oO@adietrichs· over 1 year ago

I think Hasu here identifies main reason for the backlash against the recent issuance change proposal by @casparschwa and me.To be clear: Hasu is 100% right. Of course any change to such a sensitive part of the protocol requires broad community buy-in. Our intention was purely to propose this change for consideration to the community.We tried to be clear about that from the beginning, but could certainly have done a better job. As it stands, this proposal has nowhere near the required support to be accepted (quite the opposite).For context on the timeline: A final decision on inclusion on Electra will have to be made in ~4 months, barring major delays of the fork. So when we published, that was 6 months. We were aware this was a long shot and might be too short for proper community discussion and agreement, so from the beginning we thought that chances for inclusion were unclear.So why then even propose it? We separately published a big research article on the long term staking situation for Ethereum. This was the result of ~6 months of research, and more generally a conversation that has been ongoing for 2+ years.Basically, the "proper" research process here would be to only publish this endgame post, spend the next year or so debating this topic and figuring out the best roadmap (that again of course would need broad community buy-in), and only then propose concrete steps along that path.The problem: Our view is that an end state of most of ETH staked (think 80-100%) is very bad for the protocol, for multiple reasons (I'll summarize our post on that in a separate tweet soon). We think the endgame should instead be a targeting mechanism keeping staking participation at a lower level, say 20-30%.Realistically, we won't be moving towards such a system any time soon though. And we are worried that in the meantime, staking participation will keep increasing, very plausibly into the 60-90% range. If we then decide to go with such a targeting mechanism, the transition back down from this high level would be much much more painful than it would be coming from a situation closer to today.Separately, our colleague @weboftrees had been looking into alternative issuance curves for a while already. We saw one of his proposals, thought that it might be a really useful compromise for a short-term change to slow down the continued staking inflow, and decided it was worth at least proposing for Electra.Maybe even proposing anything for Electra was a mistake. I think the bigger problem was that we weren't aware this might create the impression of a "last-minute stealth core dev push". We should have been much more explicit in stressing thati) the Electra decision was still 6 months out, andii) the default for inclusion would of course be NO, and that this was just us trying to make a case for why the community should spend these 6 months debating whether the case for urgent change was strong enough to warrant accepting such a short-term change.Sorry, long tweet, but hopefully this provides some context.Side note: Even though I think this particular case was caused by a misunderstanding of our intentions, in a way I really appreciate the backlash we have been getting - it's a great illustration of the robustness of Ethereum's decentralization!